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Abstract
The focus of this article is to explore the notion of pupil feedback  and possible 
ways in which it can be understood and developed  using Jürgen Habermas’ s 
theory of Communicative Action. The theoretical position adopted is framed 
within the concept of assessment for learning, and is particularly related to the 
notion of assessment as learning within AfL. Furthermore, the paper is located 
within a social constructivist perspective.  Jürgen Habermas’ s theory of 
Communicative Action enables us to recognise that feedback, and more 
importantly the interpretation of feedback , cannot be a one way process. 
Without recognition of pupil interpretation, its very purpose (to alter the learning 
gap) is compromised.  
This paper offers new ways of exploring feedback, which recognise complexity 
and the importance of interpretation and relationships in shared negotiated 
communicative contexts.  It further contributes to the ways in which assessment 
and learning are understood and intersect. 
Key words: feedback, communicative action, learning-gap, assessment-as-
learning,
Context and Introduction
The importance of feedback to pupils as part of the interconnection of teaching, 
learning and assessment is well identified and documented in the research 
literature.  Hattie & Timperley (2007) and Shute (2008) perhaps offer the most 
detailed accounts. The notion of feedback explored in this paper falls clearly 
within the  conceptualisation of Assessment for Learning (Black & Wiliam, 1998; 
Sadler, 1998)  as well as being related to Assessment as Learning (Dann 2002 
and 2014), highlighting the  ways in which feedback enables learning to advance 
as part of the learning process. The notion of Assessment as Learning (AaL) 
advanced here relates to possible ways in which processes of engaging in 
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assessment and thinking about assessment may also become dimensions of 
learning. Dann states  that AaL is “the complex interplay of assessment, teaching 
and learning which holds at its core the notion that pupils must understand their 
own learning progress and goals through a range  of processes which are in 
themselves cognitive events“ (2014: 151). This contrasts  with  the  use of AaL in 
the ‘deformative’  sense in which assessment takes  over and dominates the 
curriculum, so that what is assessed is mainly what is learnt (Torrance:, 2007 and 
2012).
Black & Wiliam (2009 p.10) highlight the importance of AFl as being concerned 
with the creation of and capitalization upon ‘moments of contingency’ .  The 
focus here is with influencing and shaping the future. Indeed Hattie & Timperley 
(2007) promote three key feedback questions:  “Where am I going?  How am I 
going? Where next? “ But the evidence also shows  that feedback can often yield 
no improvement in learning or, in the worst case, decrease learning (Black and 
Wiliam, 1998). Establishing the parameters of effective feedback has featured in 
the literature over several decades and is worthy of brief attention as a prelude 
to exploring the possible application of Habermas’s  (1984, 1987) notion of 
Communicative Action.  After considering what we know about feedback and its 
limitations, some examination will be given to Habermas’s notion of 
Communicative Action so that its possible role in facilitating new thinking will be 
explored.  Although CA will be considered more fully subsequently in the paper, 
in its crudest sense, it is a speech act between at least two individuals in which 
interpretation is genuinely sought from each participant so that agreement can 
be reached through negotiated agreement.  (Habermas,1984).  In considering 
what CA means and how it might be applied, discussion includes some brief 
consideration of the political UK education context with particular reference to 
the school as an example of a colonised space with a dominant performance 
agenda (Habermas, 1987)). Discussion and how ideas for feedback practices 
may be distilled from Habermas notion of CA form an alternative discourse. The 
final section of the paper suggests some of the opportunities that adopting some 
of Habermas’s thinking may have for development of the practices of feedback. 
What do we know about the process of feedback within the teaching 
and learning encounter?
Sadler has  offered considerable groundwork for our understanding of feedback. 
His original contribution (1989) suggests that feedback is a mechanism for 
helping to close the learning gap. Its purpose is to reduce the gap between what 
is known and what needs to be known. Its success, therefore, is dependent on it 
being able to “alter the gap” (p. 121) and so helping learning to progress. Sadler 
promotes three typical teacher acts which, he claims, define feedback (1998). 
Firstly, that “the teacher must attend to the learners’ production” (p. 80). 
Secondly, that the teacher makes some kind of evaluation against a background 
or framework reference which involves identifying pupils’ strengths and 
weaknesses. Finally, the teacher makes an explicit response, mark, grade or 
verbal/written statement about the quality and the shortcomings that can be 
remedied. Sadler suggests that these acts require that teachers bring a 
particular set of experiential and intellectual resources including:  superior 
knowledge; a disposition that drives their intentions to help learners; knowledge 
of how to gain pupils’ responses that show their learning, understanding of 
expected standards, skills in making evaluative judgements, and  framing 
feedback statements.  Although Sadler recognises that perhaps these processes 
may seem “unidirectional” he welcomes pupil involvement.  He promotes the 
view that “a strong case can be made that students should be taught how to 
change their pattern of thinking so that they know not only how to respond to 
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and solve (externally sourced) problems but also how to frame problems 
themselves” (p. 81). Furthermore, he argues for consideration of the language, 
which teachers use for feedback ensuring that terminology is already known and 
understood by the learners. (p. 82) He suggests that perhaps learners should be 
inducted into the feedback processes used by the teachers so that they  can 
more fully participate. Accordingly, the importance of pupil self and peer 
assessment features as a possibility.
 What Sadler stops short of recognising are that pupils may need to engage with 
feedback quite differently. Indeed Sadler makes claims to the contrary offering 
his view that ”any tendency on the part of the teacher to provide differential 
levels of feedback for learners of different levels of performance (especially at 
the lower end) treats students inequitably” (p. 82). His view of feedback offers a 
picture which begins to explore purpose and processes. His view seems to only 
acknowledge pupils as recipients or as participants who need greater skills in 
understanding pre-stated processes of expertise that teachers might like to more 
deliberately share with learners. Even though pupil self and peer assessment is 
brought into consideration it is done so in a fairly pre-determined way.
When feedback is focused on altering a learning gap, the way in which this is gap 
is both constructed and managed seems critical. More critical than perhaps 
Sadler acknowledges. It may well be that pupils try to alter their own learning 
gaps in unintended ways, possibly by even disengaging with the goals set 
(Steinberg: 1996). This may call for the need to explore rather than close the 
learning gap (Torrance, 2012; Dann, 2014).
It is perhaps Torrance & Pryor (1998) and Pryor & Croussard (2008) who give the 
clearest insight into possible categorisations in which feedback, as part of 
formative assessment, may be regarded. Torrance and Pryor (1998) identify 
feedback as convergent or divergent .  Convergent assessment  being reflected 
by 
“the teacher giving closed or pseudo-open questions and tasks where 
there was a clear idea (at least for the teacher) of what constituted a 
correct response. They then gave authoritative, judgmental or quantitative 
feedback on what the learners said or did where errors were contrasted 
with correct responses. This feedback focused on the successful 
completion of the task in hand.” (Pryor & Croussouard, 2008, p. 4). 
It can be seem in similar terms to Black & Wiliam’s (1998) notion of feedback 
directed to pupils’ objective needs (p. 17); directive feedback and in keeping with 
Hattie & Timperley’s  (2007) ‘ask-focused’ feedback (p. 91).
Divergent assessment, on the other hand, is seen as more open, looking for what 
pupils understand or can do. Feedback, within divergent assessment, is identified 
as “exploratory, provisional and provocative” (p. 4) Such distinctions can also be 
linked to typologies of feedback which are well illustrated by Tunstall & Gipps 
(1996)who identified feedback as being evaluative or descriptive in either 
positive or negative ways.  Adding to attempts at clarification and definition, 
Hattie & Timperley seek to identify four levels of feedback:  feedback on the task 
(FT); on the process to complete the task (FP); feedback on the process of self-
regulation (FR); feedback on the self as a  person (FS). They claim that FS, which 
is usually in the form of praise, is least effective. 
Significant attention has been given in recent years to explore aspects of 
classroom practice in terms of, ‘what works’. Trying to understand feedback and 
its role in promoting learning, seems closely linked to such attempts. Clearly, 
what works may be constructed in a variety of ways. Meta- analysis has been a 
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significant factor in recent years in establishing how practices might be taken 
forward. Hattie’s work (2009 and 2012) has helped frame how research evidence 
might be interpreted and used as an evidence base for practice in schools. 
Some of the meta-analysis put forward by Hattie features in the Educational 
Endowment Fund /Sutton Trust toolkit (2014). Here the ‘effect size’ of feedback is 
ranked as the highest (along with self-regulation and metacognition) of 
advancing learning by about 8 months. It is considered to have low cost, high 
impact and be based on medium levels of evidence.  It is clearly promoted as a 
classroom practice worth pursuing. However, when looking more closely at 
Hattie’s commentary and to some extent the notes in the toolkit, understanding 
feedback and putting it into practice is far more complex. Even when the focus is 
exclusively on analysis of quantitative research data (Hattie, 2009 preface ix) 
and success is measured mainly in terms of gains in academic achievement, 
feedback as a simple act which can easily be framed in order to promote learning 
lies far beyond the scope of most studies.  Studies which are more classroom 
bound and qualitative illustrate how what happens in classrooms is often based 
on quite formal and prescribed notions of feedback. Murtagh (2014) examines 
the practices of two primary school teachers, who despite being clear of their 
own intentions of using feedback to enhance learning, seem to fall short of what 
they aim to achieve. Similarly, Hargreaves (2013) gleans information from the 
children about how they experience teacher feedback in order to try and 
ascertain its impact on their learning.  What emerges in classrooms is that 
feedback is understood to be powerful and has the potential to impact 
significantly on learning. However, the role of the teacher in giving feedback is 
all too often naively constructed as a one way process which will lead to closing a 
learning gap which is predetermined by the teacher  in a tightly focused 
externally measured objectives driven context (Nicol & Macfarlane-Dick, 2006). 
The many facets of feedback emerging from the literature seem to identify both 
possibilities and limitations. Some difficulties that limit our understanding of 
feedback also need to be highlighted before attention is turned to what 
Habermas may have to offer.  Consideration is now given to recognising some of 
these current difficulties.  
Identifying the limits of our understanding of feedback. 
Children for whom feedback may be even less useful are often those, as 
Bourdieu (1990, p. 66) identifies as being without a ‘feel for the game’.  From 
Bourdieu’s perspective, the school is the ‘field’ in which the game is played. 
Participants will use their capital, strategies, beliefs, priorities to play this game. 
There is a presumption that all will invest in the game.  It may be, however, that 
a “sense of good investment…dictates a withdrawal from outmoded, or simply 
devalued, objects, places or practices” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 249). If Bourdieu’s 
thinking helps us here, some pupils may choose to be highly selective in the 
aspects of schooling in which they chose to invest. Thus, focused feedback from 
the teacher may often be seen as irrelevant. Black, et.al. (2006) highlight a 
similar train of thought as they claim “intentional learners” gain most from 
feedback. By implication, there are those who are not intent on learning, or who 
are less intentional in their approach to learning. In order to benefit from 
feedback there must be some desire for the pupil to want to move forward with 
his/her learning. There may be pupils, such as those Fisher recognises (2011 and 
2014), who are shy and on the margins of the classroom, often  girls, who hide 
behind a veil of compliance feeling that they should not indicate if they think 
differently or are dissatisfied. Research also points to particular learning 
dispositions. Perkins (1995) suggests that these are the “proclivities that lead us 
in one direction rather than another, within the freedom of action that we have” 
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(p.275). Carr and Claxton (2002) suggest that they include curiosity, 
opportunism, resilience, playfulness and reciprocity. “These are neither unique to 
a specific situation nor generally manifested across all situations” (p. 12). 
However, they argue that such dispositions influence the ways in which we learn 
how to learn. Feedback may therefore provide a useful tool, enabling pupils to 
develop their own learning. However, accompanying learning dispositions, their 
nature and employment, may be of particular significance and require some 
attention. 
It is perhaps Dweck’s (2012) work that offers both a synthesis and reduction of 
some of the ideas inherent in learner dispositions. Her suggestions, summarised 
in her more popular text suggest there are two mindsets (growth and fixed) 
which gives a glimpse of how learners chose to embrace the development of 
their own learning. Those with a fixed mindset tend to see themselves as limited 
to a particular set of abilities which may serve them well until they experience 
failure or diminished success. Often lack of success, in the individual with a fixed 
mindset, results in a reluctance to take on board the necessary steps to 
overcome the failure and move forwards. They may blame themselves or others 
but struggle to see how they can move themselves forward. The growth mindset, 
on the other hand, refers to the way in which individuals rise to the challenge of 
failure or reduced success and draw on whatever resources they can to change 
the situation. Clearly, this has strong implications for the way that individuals use 
the feedback on offer to them. Part of Dweck’s analysis also reveals how a 
mindset can change individuals so that they can begin to see their own learning 
differently. This is also echoed in Carr & Claxton’s work (2002 and Claxton 2008). 
It thus leaves open ways of using learning and assessment resources more 
strategically to promote learning and learning dispositions. Feedback could be 
considered as a resource, which is partly determined through assessment, for the 
purposes of learning. It is, therefore, clearly part of assessment for learning and 
may be usefully developed to both understand and enhance learner dispositions. 
Furthermore, through drawing on a particular process of using feedback through 
communicative action it may also enable learners to develop their learning skills 
and thus be considered within the notion of assessment as learning (Dann, 
2014). 
The main purpose of this paper is to offer an additional conceptual basis for how 
we might move forwards with feedback, addressing the possibilities and the 
limitations of the role and practice of classroom feedback.   In addition to the 
points made about children’s’ reluctance to engage with feedback and learning 
there are also difficulties establishing the best types of feedback.  Currently the 
research evidence suggests that feedback is not uniformly successful in terms of 
the effectiveness of the types of feedback used.  Furthermore, evidence indicates 
that feedback focused on specific description information given to pupils on their 
work is more effective than feedback which is linked to personal effort, praise or 
reward. (Hattie & Timperley, 2007, Kluger & De Nisi, 1996). Also of importance is 
that feedback is contextual, recognising that learning takes place in a learning 
environment in which pupils interpret their experiences (Hargreaves, 2013) and 
draws on their own self-regulatory devices and learning dispositions (Carr & 
Claxton 2002, Boekaerts & Lorno, 2005).
When the research on feedback is synthesised it reveals a complex picture. This 
seems quite different from the practices in classrooms. Within teaching and 
learning contexts, which are increasingly objective with prescribed goal 
orientations, feedback seems tightly focused and often fairly unproblematic 
(Murtagh, 2014). Teachers frequently offer targeted feedback on which pupils 
should act. Often opportunities for pupils to engage with such feedback is 
9
apportioned particular time, timetabled daily or weekly and given labels such as 
“fix it time” . Sometimes scope is given to pupils to respond to feedback given by 
the teacher so that a dialogue can emerge. Nevertheless, this can lead to little 
more than a ‘forced dialogue’ which is explicitly linked to teaching and the 
teachers priorities (Leganger-Krogstrad, 2014). Alexander (2008), in pointing 
towards possibilities for dialogic assessment, indicates that dialogic assessment 
“informs the teacher and the pupil precisely how that learning is progressing and 
what needs to be done to accelerate and consolidate it” (p. 33). The use of the 
word “precisely” seems to suggest that even a dialogic dimension to feedback is 
tightly focused and specifically targeted.  Notions of developing dialogue for 
formative assessment which may help us move forwards in terms understanding 
pupil autonomy and interpretation  are still unclear and under researched 
(Hargreaves, 2013) . Lefstein (2010) claims that “the institution of schooling 
constrains the ways in which dialogue can be conducted within its domain” (p. 
171). Lefstein identifies a tension between the rules and relationships which may 
beset meaningful dialogue to enable learning. This seems particularly pertinent 
as feedback is explored. The imperative to focus learning on objective 
measurables and to be accountable for aspects of pupil progress may add to the 
tensions on the teacher/pupil relationships which feedback seeks to foster. It is in 
an attempt to explore feedback more fully, so that the process of feedback itself 
can enhance learning in a broader sense that the focus of this paper will turn. 
What currently seems lacking in conceptualising feedback is a sense in which 
processes of feedback are reciprocally linked in order to facilitate learning and 
illuminate how feedback and the feedback relationship can be enhanced. It is at 
this point that Habermas may offer some useful insights that can help 
conceptualise feedback in a way that will further frame our understanding.
Some foundations for Understanding Habermas
Habermas’s extensive writings are not focused on assessment, and their 
consideration in this paper may be considered an application of his thinking. 
Although Habermas offers a philosophical exposition of a meta-theory for how 
social, political and economic systems may be explored and explained, this paper 
is not seeking to espouse his meta-level thinking and apply it at a macro level. 
Indeed, Habermas has been the subject of considerable critique, not least by 
those who advocate a more postmodern perspective. For example, his attempt to 
be the mediating answer between the positivist and the postmodern falls flat in 
the eyes of many philosophers (eg. Riccoer, 2008, Lyotard, 1994.) Rather, 
Habermas’s theory is explored in terms of its application at a micro level within 
the school system. It is more specifically focused through the practices of 
Communicative Action which draw on a more pragmatic dimension to 
Habermas’s thinking, which is grounded in the way in which he perceives the 
importance of linking the objective, the social and the personal.
Building on the previous discussion of feedback and locating feedback within a 
formative context which promotes AaL, this paper seeks to explore ways in which 
the notion of CA may offer new insights to further developing feedback practices. 
Habermas draws from both pragmatism and hermeneutics, recognising that 
knowledge is socially constructed and understood and enacted through 
communication (speech acts).  The process of communication is central for 
Habermas. Hence, the potential usefulness of his ideas in relation to feedback, 
which is essentially a communicative mechanism, seems well founded. 
Additionally, this paper draws on Habermas’s thinking around deliberative 
democracy.  Here, Habermas’s democratic ideas are re-considered and  applied 
to pupils in an institutional context. His original principles of (“discursive”) 
deliberative democracy relate to a form of government in society which 
recognises equality and the importance of avenues for moral disagreement and 
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discussion which ultimately aim towards mutual conclusions yet perpetually 
leave opportunities further challenge and discussion. (Habermas, 1998) . 
Application here is brief as this paper is not focusing at a macro level and centres 
on relationships between teachers and pupils which may limit how democratic 
processes are practiced. However, there are some useful threads to be teased 
out from Habermas’ s writings. 
To set the scene, it is noted that Habermas defines CA  as “ the interaction of at 
least two subjects capable of speech acts and action who establish interpersonal 
relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach 
understanding about the action situation and their plans for action in order to 
coordinate actions by way of agreement. The central concept of interpretation 
refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit 
[of] consensus.” (Habermas 1984, p. 86) Habermas makes a clear distinction 
between strategic action and communicative action. The former, may generally 
describe much of what feedback seeks to achieve. That is, for someone with a 
particular view (teacher) to influence the actions of another (pupil).  Significantly 
different to strategic action, Habermas claims, communicative action requires 
“communicatively achieved agreement [which] has a rational basis; it cannot be 
imposed by either party, whether instrumentally through intervention in the 
situation directly or strategically through influencing the decisions of opponents.” 
(1984: 287). Any attempt to gain agreement in a forced or strategic way, 
Habermas claims, is unlikely to be successful. Obviously, a clear argument can 
be levied here that the teachers’ role is to direct and focus learning. Indeed, in 
England, teachers are directly accountable, through performance management, 
for their pupil’s progress. What Habermas allows us to consider is that learning is 
not fully controlled by teachers, although they hopefully significantly influence it. 
This requires us to shift the focus to recognising that pupils have a role in 
controlling and regulating their learning. Agreeing actions through 
communicative processes such as feedback should be considered to help align 
intentions and consequences, through negotiated meanings.
The fundamental concepts underpinning the ways in which Habermas 
conceptualizes his contribution, require further attention. This is important for 
considering the possibilities and the limitations of his ideas related to pupil 
feedback.  Firstly, his concern is with rationality and knowledge.  Habermas 
offers a detailed exposition of the ways in which he understands knowledge, 
offering his views on how it is constructed. His position has been explored and 
critiqued within philosophy. In-depth analysis of his philosophical position has 
been afforded by many philosophers and formed the subject of considerable 
debate and contention  (see Ricoeur, 2008  Lyotard, 1984, McCarthy 1981,- for 
such accounts ). 
As with any philosophical position, it is framed by certain values beliefs and 
insights. Highlighting what these are is the important purpose of this section so 
that some justification of the relevance of Habermas’ s position can be 
deliberated for application to understanding notions of feedback. Habermas 
identifies a close link between rationality and knowledge. He claims that 
rationality is not about possession of knowledge but about  how speaking acting 
people acquire and use it (1984:9). It is related to the ways “truths” are 
expressed and argued for in their particular contexts. Therefore,  whether they 
are grounded in the objective world or whether they are propositional and related 
to a proposed objective world, which could be criticised and contested, are both 
relevant. For Habermas, understanding rationality draws together propositional 
knowledge (what might be for the individual subject) together with the objective, 
which, may be used in different ways for different purposes. He distinguishes 
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goal orientated purposes from phenomenological ones in which rational 
expressions “have character of meaningful actions intelligible in their context, 
through which the actor relates to something in the objective world (1984:13).  
Habermas promotes his position on knowledge, which incorporates both the 
objective goal orientated world as well as the subjective phenomenological 
world.   Moran & Murphy (2012) discuss Habermas’ s perspective as being a 
“philosophy of between”.   Of course embracing such opposites and sitting 
‘between’ transitionally opposing perspectives, could be considered impossible 
for those at either end of this particular philosophical debate. Yet his attempt to 
bring these two sides together offers an attractive one for teachers and 
researchers who desperately seek to hold, in some kind of tension, the objective 
realities of our goal orientated test driven education system with the uniqueness 
of each child in a learning encounter.  For Habermas, the tension (between the 
objective and the subjective) is maintained by reasoned argument. Thus, for 
Habermas, each participant, in communicative activity, needs to take a position 
in which each can offer explanation and reason for their view. As part of this 
process, argumentation is also a feature in which the basis for a perspective is 
developed through discourse. Here validity claims may be defended or criticised. 
Thus argumentation is important as part of the process of learning and, by 
extension, formative feedback in the classroom. Through argumentation, 
mistakes can be corrected, and failed interventions amended. It allows other 
positions to be considered as part of the learning process. For Habermas, the 
focus of argumentation will have both normative and moral dimensions. Norms, 
would be themes with particular domains that have relevance to all, clearly 
deserving recognition. “Valid norms must be capable in principle of meeting with 
the rationally motivated approach of everyone affected under conditions that 
neutralise all motives except that of cooperatively seeking the truth” (1984:19).
Thus, within our school system the national curriculum could be presented as a 
norm as part of the focus of learning. It can, therefore, have a legitimate place in 
communicative acts between the teacher and learner (obviously a vital 
consideration). However, each participant will engage with such norms 
differently, which would form the focus of rational discussion. Argumentation is 
therefore the process of reflective continuation, with different means of action 
orientated to reaching understanding. Although argumentation may be 
normatively regulated, through existing external agreed knowledge, it should be 
discussed, redeemed or rejected by participants (p. 25). If we are to draw from 
Habermas’s insights here we will need to consider whether, and if so in what 
ways, the process of feedback should include elements of argumentation. 
In addition to the way in which norms are rationalised and argued there is an 
additional assumption which is central to Habermas’s thinking. This is the notion 
of lifeworld (Lebenswelf). This pervades his thinking in that all attempts to 
develop knowledge and understanding must take notice of each individual’s own 
beliefs and convictions. “The structures of the lifeworld lay down the forms of 
intersubjectivity of possible understanding” (1987:126). Habermas therefore 
recognises that in each learning encounter, acknowledgement must be given to 
the objective world; the shared community (social world);  and the individuals 
own lifeworld (subjective world). This will include previously successful and 
unsuccessful encounters with assessment and feedback, with all the hopes, fears 
and expectations that these call forth.  Each has validity claims, for its 
significance, that require some consideration as interpretation of new meanings 
emerge through arguments and communication. The relative proportions or 
weightings of each may alter in different contexts, yet the importance of all three 
worlds remains a priority.  (p.100)
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The underpinning notions which Habermas’ discusses here offer interesting 
insights into how feedback can be further conceptualised. Some of the 
limitations in current practices, and inconsistencies in effectiveness can be 
usefully explored by reference to Habermas’ s thinking. The focus for feedback, 
whether it is positive, negative, descriptive or evaluative, task-focused or person-
focused, may be usefully explored in terms of rational and argumentative 
processes which are used to interpret the next steps for learning. Feedback may 
be interpreted differently by ‘actors’ . Accordingly, the assumption that it can 
offer a stable and unambiguous way of influencing learning, may be contested. 
Another way of understanding the potential of feedback in Habermas’s terms 
would be as a form of communication in which “participants rely on problematic 
and unclarified presuppositions and feel their way from one occasional 
commonality to the next.” (Habermas, 1984, 101). As each actor draws on the 
‘three worlds’ differently , even if there is agreement in the way that feedback is 
interpreted, this still leaves unresolved the way in which action is subsequently 
implemented. Through communicative action the processes of communication is 
seen as a way of co-coordinating future action. Thus, communication acts as a 
vehicle for sharing judgments about what has been achieved, for interpretation 
of what is needed next and for negotiation of possible actions to move forwards. 
These need to be drawn from the perspectives of each actor.  There are 
assumptions in the classroom context that all actors will choose to engage fully 
in this process. Recognition of research by Dweck (2012) and Carr & Claxton 
(2002) indicate that  those children who may be less inclined to develop their 
learning may benefit from more specific communication which helps change their 
disposition and understanding of their own agency.  This leads to a further area 
of clarification in applying Habermas’s theory. Since the feedback being 
considered relates to communication between a teacher and a pupil, further 
justification is needed as to whether children are able to participate in this power 
dynamic. Additionally, whether children are developmentally competent to 
engage in the processes of communication and thinking, which Habermas 
promotes, requires exploration. 
Habermas does not give much consideration to how his ideas might be 
developed in school contexts. However, his work adequately indicates that 
institutions, such as schools fit into his ideas of communities and domains in 
society and that he relates some of his ideas to learning. Habermas seems to 
take on Dewey’s notion of schools being a “weak public” (Dewey, 1927). There 
are two further factors to be teased out in this paper with important relevance to 
applying Habermas’ s thinking  to the pupils’ role and relationships within 
feedback. Firstly, children’s developmental position and secondly, their power 
status. 
Understanding the pupil/ teacher relationship in feedback using a 
Habermasian perspectives. 
If Habermas’s thinking on communicative action is to be relevant for considering 
how feedback might be better understood and utilised in classrooms, attempts to 
better understand the teacher /pupil relationship are important. A particular 
dimension of understanding feedback practices must be the extent to which a 
recipient is able to consider next steps in learning which they have hitherto not 
yet understood or grasped. If the recipient is a child, does his/her more limited 
conceptual framework limit his/her capacity to engage with feedback? Does he 
draw on what adults would consider to be irrational and does his/her previous 
experience frighten him/her? Such issues have been raised in the literature 
(Sadler 1989, 1998 and Black & Wiliam, 1998) and relate to the importance of 
pupils gaining feedback that they can link to their own existing capabilities and 
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achievements purposefully. What needs further probing as we explore what 
Habermas offers, is not only whether the pupil can respond to the content 
messages in feedback but also to the moral and rational skills required.  If we are 
to take on Habermas’ s principles that require pupils to enter into a 
communicative exchange in which each actor presents and justifies his/her own 
views and meaningfully negotiates a way forward with agreed action, then a 
range of additional skills are needed. Habermas (1990) has already devoted 
attention to issues of both cognitive and moral development. He recognised that 
learners’ moral consciousness has a significant role in the learning process. 
Habermas argues that beneath cognitive strands of learning and knowledge lies 
a moral consciousness which will shape learners’ identity, judgements, 
interpretations and skills in reciprocity. He draws on Kohlberg’s theory, 
highlighting that moral judgements have cognitive content, some universalistic 
principles and are dependent on discourse. Kohlberg’s theory, which Habermas 
positions as his starting point, outlines a developmental model for the formation 
of reversibility, universality and reciprocity. Transition through the stages in this 
model is part of the learning process in which learners become more skilled at 
using their moral judgment through argumentation. They become more skilled at 
recognising competing perspectives, and deciding how they will move from 
discourse to action in their own learning. Habermas, in recognising that 
Kohlberg’s theory may not fully explain all the he needs, also draws on Robert 
Selman’s work on perspective taking (1990). Habermas considers that Selman’s 
work offers some important insights into understanding the extent to which 
children are able to engage with others reciprocally. Habermas concludes that 
from as young an age as 5 children are increasingly able to recognise the 
differentiated roles of others and increasingly, from the age of 7, form reciprocal 
relationships (from Habermas 1990, 142-143). Habermas also indicates the 
capacity for a child to communicate, is fully possible by the ages of 5-9 when the 
processes of acquiring language is complete.  Accordingly, there are no specific 
developmental barriers to the processes of communicative action being 
increasingly developed with children from the age of about 7. Indeed it could be 
argued that being more specific in trying to engage with such processes may 
enable and enhance these inherent skills as well as the specific learning targeted 
in feedback.  (This will be further developed later in this paper). 
Having argued that the dimension of developmental capacity is not a significant 
limiting factor in further developing Habermas’s ideas, a dimension that may 
create more of an issue needs to be tackled. This concerns the power dynamic 
between the teacher and the pupil. A significant strand of Habermas’s writing 
links to the nature of the relationships between individuals. So, in addition to the 
way knowledge is understood, shared and interpreted; and alongside moral 
consciousness and judgment are issues related to power and democracy in the 
process of communicative action. How does the power dynamic function within 
feedback, and in what ways does what is visible actually reflect feedback 
processes? The literature highlights that often feedback is seen as one way, 
teachers give feedback and pupils are supposed to receive and act on it. 
Recognition that the pupils’ role may be more complex and that closing the 
learning gap is not a one directional simplistic process, has prompted a search 
for a different theoretical position.  However, pursuing Habermas’s theory, 
requires a very different power dynamic.  It is important that in exploring a 
different position that there are legitimate grounds for so doing both theoretically 
and practically. This is a considerable area for discussion, but will have adequate, 
if limited attention in this paper. 
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An important consideration for Habermas, and one that gives purpose to his 
notion of communicative action, is deliberative democracy. Habermas is not 
alone in promoting deliberative democracy. Conceptually, it is given considerable 
attention in sociology and politics (see Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). Gutmann & 
Thompson (2004) summarise deliberative democracy by explaining that it 
“affirms the need to justify decisions made by citizens and their 
representations….In deliberative democracy an important way these agents 
(persons) take part is by presenting and responding to reasons, or by demanding 
that their representatives do so….. These reasons are meant to produce a 
justifiable decision and to express the value of mutual respect.” (P.3). The 
problematic issue for consideration in the context of this paper, which includes 
children, is the extent to which children are seen as part of the democratic 
process, with particular  reference to the inherent power differences between 
teachers and pupils . Our social and political systems exclude children from their 
formal democratic processes.  In line with Selmans’ model (Habermas 1990), 
children are still developing their skills in mutual respect from the ages of 10-15. 
Without these abilities, democratic encounters may not be fully possible. 
Although democratic processes may be exclusive in many ways Habermas may 
be considered to regard democracy as part of the legitimising collective for 
groups in society…. perhaps at the expense of individual freedoms and human 
rights. There is no doubt, that within schools, teachers and pupils are not equals 
and thus we must question whether democracy can be used as a driving force 
underpinning communicative encounters.  
Although Habermas presents deliberative democracy as an important foundation 
for communication it does not necessarily need to be all encompassing. His 
recognition that there may be three worlds (objective, social and subjective) 
which should feature  in communicative interactions, agreements for decisions 
about actions, made between individuals, may differ. Within the school system 
there is clearly an imposed ‘objective world’ which looms large in every teacher’s 
view of what needs to be learnt and how pupils must demonstrate their learning, 
yet, there are different ways in which the social context and learners’ views can 
be shared and negotiated in relation to this objective world. Even though 
schooling as a whole forms part of the political system which is governed through 
democracy in the western world, democratic principles remain more loosely 
articulated within the school system. Part of the function of the school is to 
prepare pupils to become citizens within our democratic society. What is 
particularly of interest in this his paper is the way in which agreements are 
reached through the feedback process. This may be part of a process of leading 
towards democracy rather than being fully democratic.  Kreisberg’s notion of 
power with rather than power over (Torrance & Pryor, 1998:82), offers a useful 
alternative for articulating the power distinction being suggested. Hence, what is 
most valuable to draw from Habermas is his notion of deliberation. The use of 
the term deliberative as distinct from participatory democracy highlights the 
importance of the procedural. It emphasises the responsibility and consequences 
as a processes of being part of a social dimension to citizenship. Consideration in 
terms of ‘participation’ is rather more confined to being merely involved rather 
than how the individual becomes involved and sustains engagement. Englund 
(2006) suggests deliberation is “mutual and carefully-balanced consideration of 
different alternatives” (p 506). This is certainly something that should be an 
aspiration for schooling to include. Gutmann & Thompson (1996) promote the 
idea that education systems need to ensure that pupils are enabled to be 
deliberative. They claim “schools should aim to develop their student’s 
capacities to understand different perspectives, communicate their 
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understandings to other people and engage in the give-and-take of moral 
argument with a view to making mutually acceptable decisions.” (p.359)
Englund (2006) considers Habermas’ s notion of deliberative democracy to be 
less useful in schools. He recognises (from Dewey, 1927) that schools are ‘weak 
publics’, in which the distinctions between the public and the private are more 
blurred (Englund: 514). Schools, he contends, have a pluralism in which different 
views of knowledge and values need, to some extent, to co-exist. Hence, he 
suggests that drawing Habermas’ ideas of deliberative democracy and 
communicative action together could prove more relevant in the school context 
through consideration of the notion of ‘deliberative communication’.  This offers 
an interesting synthesis of the Habermasian stance on the centrality of 
purposeful communication and the coming together of different perspectives for 
a classroom context. Englund offers five characteristics of deliberative 
communication within school contexts. These seem to have a potential 
application to how we may move forward our understanding of feedback 
practices. 
1. Different views are confronted with one another along with arguments for 
these views
2. There is tolerance and respect for these other perspectives
3. Elements of collective will formation are present (ie. trying to reach 
consensus)
4.  Authorities or traditional views can be questioned and challenged 
(recognising the relationships between the private and the public)
5. There is scope for students to communicate and deliberate without 
teacher control. 
(summarised from Englund 2006: 512) 
What Englund offers is a useful application of aspects of Habermas’ s thinking, 
yet, it seems lacking. Englund’s synthesis seems to give insufficient scope for 
pragmatics, and the recognition of social action, which is implicit in Habermas’s 
original notion of communicative action. Englund’s  idea for ‘deliberative 
communication’ might be further strengthened by recognising and incorporating 
the importance of consequences. Hence, the phrase ‘deliberative communicative 
action’ may more fully embrace Habermas’s ideas. Perhaps it is a liberty to 
connect these two aspects of Habermas’s thinking. Yet they seem to reflect the 
essence of his thinking as it might be applied to a school context, involving 
pupils. It is from this theoretical position the paper moves forward to considering 
a more specific application to feedback processes is now teased out.   
How does Habermas’s notion of (deliberative) communicative action 
enable us to further understand feedback?
 As a starting point for teasing out some more specific points for application for 
Habermas’s theory there is a warning, and a stern one. It is drawn from 
Habermas himself, who recognises that the views he offers  may sit in tension 
with increasing colonisation of institutions such as schools. This might be seen in 
terms of education being colonised by an economic agenda so that the purposes 
of schooling become more influenced by measurable economic currency and 
outcomes than they are by teaching and learning relationships. Habermas 
comments on colonisation as being characterised by the “bureaucratization of 
decisions, duties and rights, responsibilities and dependencies” and re-defines 
“goals, relations and services, life-spaces and life-times”. (Habermas, 1987:322). 
This results in teaching, learning and knowledge being detached from lifeworlds 
and colonised by particular reproducing traditions which promote a particular 
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performativity discourse.  For us to benefit from Habermas’s thinking, as applied 
to feedback, there needs to be openness for learners to offer their perspectives 
and for teachers to recognised that a unidirectional focused feedback statement 
aimed at closing the learning gap, may be limiting. In recognising that there is 
scope for other ways, some suggestions for developing feedback using 
(deliberative) communicative action are offered.
Making teaching intentions and learning targets explicit.  Feedback may 
be focused on specific aspects of teaching and focused lesson objectives. The 
‘objective world’, as part of the performitivity discourse, in which there are 
prescribed norms and expectations for the curriculum and achievement is very 
real for schools. Indeed, they seem pervade the learning environment in the UK. 
These cannot be ignored. However, they need to be simply justified and related 
to the school, classroom and community contexts, and learners need the space 
to link them to their own understandings and aspirations.  Making teaching 
intentions and learning goals specific is an important dimension of classroom 
practice and one which helps to make transparent the prescribed curriculum for 
both teacher and pupil.  Furthermore, ways in which pupils need to make their 
learning ‘visible’ (Hattie, 2009), whether through classroom tasks, tests, 
assessments and examinations, should be espoused.  These form part of the 
feedback context.
Recognising that feedback is able to link the past, present and future in 
relation to what is learnt, how it is learnt and what might happen next.   Careful 
consideration should be given to the balance of each of these so that neither the 
teacher nor the learner overly prioritises one over the others. An important 
dimension of developing feedback drawing on Habermas’s principles highlights 
the importance of all participants being able to draw on their previous 
experiences. For the pupils, this may include previous fears, anxieties, failures or 
successes. It may involve articulating their own self-referenced perceptions of 
the learning journey. It could also include their perceptions of peer pressures or 
external influences, entrenched or emerging. Their aspirations and motivations 
for their next steps of learning are therefore not disconnected from the journey 
that proceeds. The teacher should also share his/her own understanding of each 
child and the unique ways in which s/he regards the learners progress and how 
the past, present and future might look and could be altered. 
Giving genuine space to the learners’ and teachers’ own priorities for 
learning in terms of content, process and disposition.  It may well be that the 
priorities of the teacher and learner differ and do not closely relate to normative 
requirements. As part of the experience of engaging with feedback, pupils and 
teachers need scope for justifying their perspectives. This need not be on a one 
to one basis at every moment of feedback. It could be part of small group 
discussion and occasional one to one encounters. It could also be with teaching 
assistants and learning support workers who are appropriately trained. 
Opportunities for learners to articulate their own interests, priorities, barriers, 
opposition, aspirations need to form part of the communication of feedback. This 
is perhaps where Habermas’s ideas are more difficult to relate to the realities of 
classrooms without careful consideration and purposeful planning. If feedback is 
merely conceived of as being a mechanism for closing a learning gap between 
what is known and what is unknown, there is no account given to the ways in 
which the pupil owns and regulates that learning gap. It may be that for some 
children, with particular learning dispositions, a tightly focused system of focused 
feedback may work well and be an important part of the way in which they 
manage and regulate their learning so that it is well aligned to the intentions of 
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teaching.  For other pupils there may be little alignment of teacher intention  to 
pupils’ learning aspirations. Tightly focused feedback, which may have all the 
positive effect characteristics, summarised by Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Shute, 
2008 and Black & Wiliam, 1998,  may yield little benefit. Where pupils clearly 
take little regard of the feedback given, entering into a processes of 
communicative action may be a way forward. Here the pupil would be invited to 
talk about three distinct “worlds” from his or her own perspective: the content of 
learning (objective world), the classroom and lesson context (social world) 
his/her own personal priorities and aspirations (lifeworld) . There would also be 
an expectation that the pupil would argue for his/her views.  The views and 
priorities of the teacher (or support worker) would also be shared and argued as 
part of the collaborative communication. This process would allow space for the 
pupil to air his/her own views which may have three key advantages. Firstly, it 
exposes rather than suppresses the pupils’ views, illustrating that someone 
wants to hear. Secondly, the process of articulating your views, achievements, 
aspirations, and difficulties can sometimes enable these to be more clearly 
crystallised.  Thirdly, it gives the teacher useful insight into how learning and 
teaching may need to be adjusted to better align curriculum priorities with the 
pupils own learning agenda. Furthermore, it offers a practical context for 
Kreisberg’s notion of power with (op cit)
Developing the role of argument in process of communicative action 
needs careful consideration. Habermas is clear to promote the role of offering 
reasoned justification for the perspectives advanced. This would hold equally for 
teachers and pupils, and could form the basis from which agreement emerges. 
The level of abstract thinking which pupils might be able (or willing) to apply to 
their thinking will vary to some extent with the child’s age. It will also vary in 
terms of the relative positioning the pupil choses to take in balancing his/her 
“three worlds”. The teacher (or adult) role in the process of communicative 
action may need to be aimed at helping to offer a justifiable reason for the pupil 
to consider rebalancing or re-positioning these three worlds.  Even though the 
content of the subject specific feedback may remain the same , the mode of 
communication, the appeal to reason and the recognition of pupil priorities each 
has a place in the pupils choosing to engage with the feedback.  Pupils therefore, 
need to be helped to think through their reasoning and justification. For younger 
children this may involve some structured questions or prompts which can aid 
their thinking. These higher level thinking skills themselves, form part of their 
learning and are a feature of engaging with the assessment and feedback 
process. The metacognitive requirements implicit here, should be seen as 
developmental and part of formative assessment demonstrated through 
‘assessment as learning’ (Dann, 2014).  There is an interesting juxtaposition here 
between assessment and learning. This illustrates that the process of being 
engaged in understanding and interpreting feedback becomes part of a pupils 
own learning processes (assessment as learning). 
Recognising the age of the child in developing feedback through 
communicative action requires adapting processes. Planning appropriate 
support for enabling the pupil to articulate a reasoned justification for his/her 
engagement with learning and with feedback should be considered. Younger 
children, whose metacognitive skills are more limited, may bring less rational 
and reasoned arguments. The process of communicative action as a forum to 
help develop metacognive skills is an important dimension and locates this form 
of feedback as part of assessment as learning. Additionally, for those under aged 
10, drawing on Selman’s theory (op cit), the adult needs to acknowledge that 
relationships are not fully mutual and that the children’s perspective is based on 
a more limited sense of the ‘other’. Nevertheless, part of the discussion about 
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perspectives and sharing views can be useful to help the learner become more 
able to see other views. Such processes could usefully enable them to develop 
the skills to begin to step outside themselves as their maturity increases. The 
way in which feedback is shared for those children using communicative action 
will therefore have to be developed in age appropriate ways. At the initial phase 
of introduction, it is suggested that feedback using communicative action should 
be one to one and outside a particular lesson context.
Consideration timing and context will form the basis of the feasibility of 
developing feedback practices. Unless the ideas suggested in this paper can be 
related to the realities of classrooms there is little likelihood that feedback using 
communicative action  can move beyond the theoretical foundation that this 
paper offers. In beginning to ground the ideas into the realities of classrooms 
there needs to be a sense in which pupils, who struggle to progress adequately, 
and for whom conventional feedback strategies seems to offer little relevance, 
can be offered an alternative feedback approach. The number of pupils selected 
in any classroom context would need to be small and one to one discussions 
developed within timetabled ‘correction time’ , ‘fix it time’, ‘finishing off time’ as 
part of a differentiated approach. The idea that this is deliberative, valued, and 
planned is an important dimension of this approach. At the start, the deliberative 
approach may be one sided, initiated by the teacher. However, clearly it is 
important to help the pupil to be deliberative in his/her engagement through 
genuine open involvement.
Balancing written and spoken communication in the process of giving 
feedback. Much of the feedback given by teachers, considered by research, 
relates to written feedback. It is more tangible in nature and thus far more easily 
analysed. Written feedback becomes part of the documentary evidence often 
used in schools for ‘making practice visible’ (Plum, 2012, 496). Furthermore, and 
more importantly, it can be composed outside the classroom context and thus 
not compete for time in the teaching and learning classroom encounters. Any 
attempt to incorporate aspects of Communicative Action into the processes of 
making feedback more successful requires creating space for dialogue.  This is 
currently particularly contentious in the UK educational arena in which spoken 
language has been given little status in the new National Curriculum. Such a 
position sits alongside a political ideology claiming, with the words of Texan 
President Lyndon B. Johnson, ’you aren’t learning anything when you’re talking.’ 
(Gove, 2013).  If Habermas’ s theory is to have value in the feedback process it 
requires language, dialogue and communication to be deliberate, meaningful and 
genuine. Feedback using CA can be  linked to what is written, it can also be given 
visibility, but quite a different visibility from that which seems to have become 
the currency, to be measured in our school accountability systems. 
Seeking genuine agreement which sets out agreed actions which are 
followed up and discussed in the future. The process of communicative action 
should be ongoing and developmental. Part of the discussion between 
participants should be about time frames and be part of ongoing discussions 
about how actions will move forward. As actions develop they may be perceived 
differently by participants. Unless communication is deliberative and ongoing if 
will be fairly futile as a component of enabling learning to progress.
Education for adults involved in feedback using Communicative Action 
will be essential. A key component of educating staff in schools would be 
ensuring that adults/teachers understand the difference between giving 
‘strategic’ feedback aimed at changing the pupils’ actions to be in line with 
teachers’ intentions, and feedback using CA. Furthermore, children who struggle 
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to respond to more conventional feedback are more likely to be chosen for 
strategies using CA. Skills in listening and giving the child his/her voice as well as 
facilitating him/her to offer reasoned arguments, in an age appropriate way, will 
need to feature in the  education programme. 
Testing Theory
This paper has attempted to consider Habermas’s theory of Communicative 
Action in relation to research evidence, possibilities and limitations of what we 
know about pupil feedback. The links forged illuminate how Habermas 
considered communication as essential to giving meaning to action as well as 
recognising that each individual should have the opportunity to reason, argue 
and present his/her views so that an agreed way forward is reached. The ideas 
elicited from Habermas offer an additional layer of thinking that has hitherto not 
been part of the way in which feedback has been considered. This paper is 
theoretical and needs to be followed by some careful application and 
development in classroom contexts. The theoretical foundations offered in this 
paper are already part of a small scale empirical study in primary school settings 
and offer rich opportunities for further research and investigation. 
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